Philia

This was my final paper for Ancient Greek Philosophy with Professor Mikhalevsky- a comparison and evaluation of Aristotle’s and Epicurus’ views on friendship.  I contend that friendship is an intrinsic good, yet Aristotle and Epicurus were too limited in their ethical frameworks to agree, even though they hint at it.

…friendship has three different species, corresponding to the three objects of love…Those who love each other for utility or pleasure love the other not in his own right, but insofar as they gain some good for themselves from him. The same is true of those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to them…And so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved…when the cause of their being friends is removed, the friendship is dissolved too…But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in their own right.
-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, 1156a-b

…friendship comes to be because of its utility but one must nevertheless make a preliminary sacrifice [for a friend] (for one must also sow the ground), and it is [then] formed by a sharing among those who are fulfilled by their pleasures.
-Diogenes Laertius, Report of Epicurus’ Ethical Views, 120b

In reading Aristotle and Epicurus, two of the most influential thinkers in Ancient Greek philosophy, amidst discussions of political theory, politics, and metaphysics, one comes across a discussion of friendship. In reading these early conceptions of friendship one can see, with great ease, the tremendous worth placed upon true companionship, seeing as these theories of friendship are grounded in discussions of the ontology and function of the human being. Yet both philosophers’ teleological theories of life are rather narrow. Thus their definitions of friendship, in turn, touch upon only a few of its intricacies. In attempting to relate the importance of friendship in the good life to their means-and-end-driven ontological and ethical theories, both men struggle, leading to contradictory thoughts and oversimplification.

The Greek word here being translated as “friendship” is philia, though it also connotes the type of love between two people that get along with one another. Philia, in its traditional sense, encompasses a broader scope of relationships than the word ‘friendship’ implies in the contemporary era. “It includes the love of members of families for each other, …the favorable attitudes of business partners and associates and of fellow citizens for each other…etc” (Aristotle, 330). Aristotle, in his tradition of categorizing various aspects of life, sorts these relationships into three types, determined by the purpose and function of the companionship. He is dismissive of two of these types of friendships- those which revolve around utility or pleasure. According to Aristotle, friendships based solely around utility tend to be limited primarily to “older people, since at that age they tend to pursue the advantageous, not the pleasant”, perhaps, for example, seeking out friends by necessity to help them as their health diminishes, and by “those in their prime or youth who pursue the expedient” possibly by dating someone wealthy, hoping to personally benefit from their excess, or by befriending a superior in work to try to move up the corporate ladder (1156a, 24-27). These friendships are often short-lived as they infrequently remain after the original need for the friendship has diminished.

Aristotle says that friends for pleasure, too, are prone to experience merely temporary friendships; they are “quick to become friends, and quick to stop; for their friendship shifts with [what they find] pleasant, and the change in such pleasure is quick” (1156a, 35-37). Here he is referring to such friendships as those based upon one person’s appreciation of a specific quality in the other insofar as it benefits the former, be it wittiness, optimism, or popularity. Also he places most erotic passion in this category, casting off these partnerships as belonging to the whim of feelings-driven, passion-seeking young people; “that is why they love and quickly stop, often changing in a single day” (1156b, 1-4).

Since neither of these varieties of friendship seem to be in accord with the good life, the life which Aristotle believes we should be living, he glorifies a third type of friendship only, which he calls “complete friendship”. This type of friendship seeks to promote the telos, or goal, that he believes humans should all strive to. As Aristotle outlines in the Metaphysics, what sets apart humans from beasts are their rational souls, which provide for the ability to think and reason. The end or goal, he argues, should deal with this extra human potentiality as compared to the potentiality of plants or animals. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle advances the claim that thinking is in fact the function of a human being. The highest good for Aristotle is a very particular type of happiness or eudaimonia, which stems etymologically from the Greek meaning loosely- the well being of the spirit. The virtuous man longs to reach this state of eudaimonia, to promote human flourishing, and is able to do this through contemplation, exercising his rational soul as a human being. Since this is the one important goal that all else aims toward, friendship too must aim toward a promotion of eudaimonia. Aristotle values friendships in which one friend is friends with the way the other encompasses virtue and contemplation, and their capabilities as a human being. If one is a friend to another who exercises his rational capabilities to the utmost of his ability as a human being, than one is also a friend to understanding itself.

Epicurus, too, bases his idea of friendship on his idea of telos, which is a state of detached bliss, free from disturbance. This state, which he calls “ataraxia” is achieved by minimizing groundless desires which refer to words tied to things that have no meaning or referent such as ‘immortality’, as well as unnecessary natural desires such as urgings for a particular flavor of food or a certain sound of music. Instead one should focus on freeing the body from pain and disturbance, seeking only natural and necessary desires such as food, water, and warmth. Epicurus sees Aristotle’s virtues as somewhat groundless desires as evident in a letter he writes to a friend, Anaxarchus: “I summon you to constant pleasures, and not to virtues, which provide [only] empty, pointless, and disturbing expectations of rewards” (Hellenistic 76). Friendship, however, if not a virtue to Epicurus, is among the highest of pleasures and can be instrumental to reaching a state of ataraxia, seeing as a true friend will help one live a life free from extravagant needs by encouraging self-sufficiency. Epicurus believes that friends act as a support system and as a self-check, seeing as one should “let nothing be done which will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your neighbour” (39).

Although he believes that friendship arises from this utility, his concurrent beliefs that “pleasure is…produced by the recollection or expectation of good things” and “sweet is the memory of a dead friend” point to his exaltation of friendship as a great good (44, 96). Rather than categorize friendships based on value like Aristotle, Epicurus views love and friendship as multifaceted as seen in his claim that “if you take away the chance to see and talk and spend time with [the beloved], then the passion of sexual love is dissolved” (37). Though he is often regarded as a hedonist, Epicurus’ philosophy regarding friendship is rather altruistic as he preaches to “display benevolence to other men at all times” although benevolence, like other merits that Epicurus praises, is valued for the pleasure that can be attained from it, rather than the virtue itself: “benefiting [others] is pleasanter than receiving benefits” (102).

True friendship, though, does seem to have more than instrumental value for Epicurus, which can perhaps be seen as somewhat incongruous to his teleological theory. Even though Epicurus believes that there is no afterlife to reward a man for his actions in life, he preaches that, “[the wise man] will sometimes die for a friend” which shows his almost inexplicable esteem for friendship (43). This awareness of the strength of the bonds of friendship here is almost irreconcilable with his teleology, “after all, friendship and commitment to others brings the risk of one’s own tranquility being disturbed, either through the efforts one must make on behalf of a friend or through anxiety at his misfortunes” (Sharples 118). This is a well thought-out argument, which raises the question; can a definition of true friendship fit within the confines of a teleological theory of the self?

This contradiction of benevolence and self-promotion toward the telos is raised in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as well. As Aristotle states, “those who wish good to the friend for the friend’s own sake are friends most of all” (Nicomachean 1156b, 10-11). It seems as though both philosophers are urged toward declaring friendship as an intrinsic good, yet Aristotle has already limited intrinsic good to eudaimonia, and Epicurus to ataraxia. In this way, teleology is restrictive. Aristotle’s claim that “the good has been explained as that at which everything aims” would seem to commit the ‘fallacy of composition’ since his premise that each of several things aims at some thing or other does not lend itself to the conclusion that there must be some one thing that they all aim at, or that this is the only good to which each thing aims (Sparshott 13). With this faulty claim held as truth, one cannot do anything for the sake of friendship alone, but only for friendship insofar as it is instrumental to reaching the telos. Questions also arise pertaining to the ‘sacrifice of the innocent’- should one befriend a man who he believes will help him reach a state of ataraxia or eudaimonia if this man condones thievery or killing? Teleology narrows this definition to the point where it is advisable by Aristotle or Epicurus’ philosophies to attempt to reach this end-goal at all costs.

I contend that friendship is itself, desirable. It cannot be categorized or be given value by an outside entity, for its implications change with circumstance. Friendship is more specific than the favorable attitudes of business partners and associates [or] of fellow citizens for each other…etc” (Aristotle, 330). It occurs when two individuals have a vested interest in the inner-workings and the going-on of each other’s lives. Sometimes this will have a functional purpose or utility, for because they are friends, one girl might learn that another does not have a dress to wear to a party so she will lend one to her. Sometimes this will have a component of pleasure, as one will enrich the other’s life by telling funny stories, or making a really good tasting apple-pie. Other times there will be more at stake as one helps the other make critical life-decisions. These are all results of friendship, but not reasons individually to choose it. One should value friendship for the vast array of opportunities that open up when two souls are working together, and choose this for its own sake. Both Aristotle’s and Epicurus’ depictions of the perfect friendship are stymied by the limiting framework of their teleological theories, leaving them at a loss in trying to describe what is evident: friendship is, intrinsically, a beautiful thing.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translation: Terrence Irwin, Second Edition. Hackett Publishing Company. April 1985.

Hellenistic Philosophy. Translation: Brad Inwood, L. P Gerson, Second Edition. Hackett Publishing Company. 1988.

Sharples, R. W. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. Routlidge. London and New York. 1996.

Sparshott, Francis. Taking Life Seriously. University of Toronto Press, 1994.